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Abstract Quantum secret sharing is a scheme for encoding a quantum state (the se-
cret) into multiple shares and distributing them among several participants. If a suf-
ficient number of shares are put together, then the secret can be fully reconstructed.
If an insufficient number of shares are put together however, no information about
the secret can be revealed. In quantum ramp secret sharing, partial information about
the secret is allowed to leak to a set of participants, called an unqualified set, that
cannot fully reconstruct the secret. By allowing this, the size of a share can be drasti-
cally reduced. This paper introduces a quantum analog of classical strong security in
ramp secret sharing schemes. While the ramp secret sharing scheme still leaks partial
information about the secret to unqualified sets of participants, the strong security
condition ensures that qudits with critical information can no longer be leaked.
Keywords quantum secret sharing · non-perfect secret sharing · ramp secret sharing ·
strong security
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1 Introduction
Secret sharing (SS) [11] is a cryptographic scheme to encode a secret to multiple
shares being distributed to participants, so that only qualified sets of participants can
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reconstruct the original secret from their shares. Traditionally both secret and shares
were classical information (bits). Several authors [4,5,12] extended the traditional
SS to a quantum one so that a quantum secret is encoded to quantum shares.
SS can be classified into two categories. One is perfect SS and the other is non-
perfect or ramp SS [9], [13, Chapter 13]. In perfect SS, we require every unqualified
set of participants to have zero information of the secret, while in non-perfect SS we
do not require such a property. A major disadvantage of perfect SS is that the size of
each share must be larger than or equal to that of secret, in both classical case [3] and
quantum case [4,5,12]. By tolerating partial information leakage to unqualified sets,
the size of shares can be much smaller than that of secret. Such an SS is called a ramp
SS or a non-perfect SS [2,6,9,14]. The quantum ramp SS was proposed by Ogawa et
al. [10]. In both Ogawa et al.’s scheme and our proposal, the size of shares is L times
smaller than that of the secret, where L is the number of qudits in a secret. This paper
focuses only on the quantum ramp SS.
For a general ramp SS, an unqualified set of participants is allowed to have partial
information of the secret. This can be undesirable in some cases. For example, con-
sider a classical secret representing “username : password”. When an unqualified
set has 8-symbol partial information of the secret, it could know all of “password”,
which is critical confidential information. The existence of such a case is demon-
strated in an explicit example by Iwamoto and Yamamoto [6]. The first purpose of
this paper is to demonstrate a similar danger in the quantum ramp SS [10] by provid-
ing an explicit example.
In order to prevent such cases, Yamamoto [6,14] defined the strong security of
classical ramp SS as follows: A (k, L, n) strongly secure classical ramp SS distributes
L symbols of a classical secret s to n symbols such that any k or more participants can
determine s while any i symbols of s is kept completely secret to any (k − i) or less
participants, where each participant has one symbol. Thus a strongly secure ramp SS
excludes the danger explained in the last paragraph.
The second purpose of this paper is to adapt the strong security criterion in the
classical case to the quantum case. We define a quantum (k, L, n) strongly secure
ramp SS as a quantum ramp SS that distributes L qudits of a quantum secret σ to n
qudits ρ such that any k or more participants can determine σ while any i qudits of σ
is kept completely secret from any k − i or less participants, where each participant
has one qudit.
The third purpose of this paper is to provide an explicit construction of quantum
ramp SS realizing the strong security with the same efficiency as the conventional
quantum ramp SS in [10]. The difference of constructions between [10] and ours is
as follows: While Ogawa et al. [10] encode a secret to coefficients of a polynomial, we
encode it to the function values of a polynomial as done in [7,8] for the construction
of classical strongly secure SS.
We stress that this paper studies ramp (non-perfect) SS while [4,5,12] studied
perfect SS, and that none of the results in this paper are contained in [4,5,12].
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 demonstrates how Ogawa et al.’s
encoding fails to satisfy an intuitive quantum version of Yamamoto’s classical strong
security. Section 3 formalizes the strong security criterion for quantum ramp SS. Sec-
tion 4 proposes the encoding of secrets. Section 5 proposes the decoding of secrets.
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Section 6 proves the strong security of the proposed scheme. Section 7 gives con-
cluding remarks.
2 Motivation for Quantum Strong Security
We will show here how Ogawa et al.’s secret sharing scheme fails to satisfy the strong
security condition. Let Gi and H j be q-dimensional complex linear spaces. We refer
to quantum systems represented by Gi and H j as qudits. We assume q to be a prime
power, and denote by Fq the finite field with q elements. We also assume that or-
thonormal bases of Gi and H j are indexed by Fq as {|s〉}s∈Fq .
In Ogawa et al.’s (k, L, n) ramp secret sharing scheme, the encoding of a quantum
secret is defined by unique public values (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ Fnq and the transformation of
an L-qudit secret |s1, . . . , sL〉, to
1√
qk−L
∑
c∈D(sL)
|pc(x1), . . . , pc(xn)〉,
where D(sL) =
{
(c1, . . . , ck) ∈ Fkq | ∀i∈{1,...,L} ci = si
}
, and pc(x) = c1 + c2x + . . . +
ck−1xk−1 the polynomial whose coeffcients are specified by c = (c1, . . . , ck). We now
provide a specific example in which an unqualified set is able to reconstruct one qudit
of the secret.
Example 1 We consider this scheme where the number of qudits in the secret L = 2,
the minimal number of participants needed to decode the secret k = 3, the number
of shares n = 4, and the size of the field q = 7. Public values x = (2, 3, 1, 6) ∈ F47.
The quantum secret has qL = 49 dimensions. Its orthonormal basis is the set {|s1 s2〉 |
s1, s2 ∈ F7}.
We choose a particular basis state |s1s2〉 to be the secret and consider the shares
encoded from |s1s2〉. The set D(s1, s2) consists of coefficients ci = (s1, s2, ri) where
i ∈ {1, . . . , 7} and ri = i − 1 ∈ F7. These coefficients specify polynomials to be in the
form:
p(x)i = s1 + s2 x + ri x2.
The four shares, corresponding to ci = (s1, s2, ri), are therefore given by
pci (2) = s1 + 2s2 + 4ri,
pci (3) = s1 + 3s2 + 2ri,
pci (1) = s1 + s2 + ri,
pci (6) = s1 + 6s2 + ri.
The encoded state of four shares is
1√
7
(|pc1 (2), pc1 (3), pc1 (1), pc1 (6)〉 + |pc2 (2), pc2 (3), pc2 (1), pc2 (6)〉+
|pc3 (2), pc3 (3), pc3 (1), pc3 (6)〉 + |pc4 (2), pc4 (3), pc4 (1), pc4 (6)〉+
|pc5 (2), pc5 (3), pc5 (1), pc5 (6)〉 + |pc6 (2), pc6 (3), pc6 (1), pc6 (6)〉+
|pc7 (2), pc7 (3), pc7 (1), pc7 (6)〉).
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Since 12 = (−1)2 = 62 = 1 ∈ F7, the coefficients of ri in the 3rd and the 4th shares
are both 1, which provides us with the classical equation
s2 = 4p(1)i − 4p(6)i. (1)
This shows that the value s2 can be retrieved using information from the 3rd and 4th
participants. In the quantum setting, the 3rd and the 4th participants can collectively
apply a unitary matrix U based on (1) to produce |s2〉 (entangled with the rest of the
shares).
A full rank matrix that performs our desired classical transformation is
M =
(
4 4
−4 4
)
=
(
4 4
3 4
)
.
This classical transformation performs a change of basis indices for our quantum
state. The unitary quantum transformationU, corresponding to M, sends |pci(1), pci (6)〉
of the 3rd and 4th participants to
|(pci (1), pci (6)) · M〉 = |s2, s1 + ri〉.
U is unitary because it just permutes basis vectors.
After applying such a transformation on the 3rd and 4th shares, a measurement in
the basis {|0〉, . . . , |6〉} can read off the index s2. If the s2-component of the quantum
secret happens to be classical information, then it can be completely read off by the
3rd and the 4th participants. Therefore two shares (an unqualified set) are capable
of obtaining partial information of the secret. The strong security condition exists
to make sure that no qudits of critical information can be revealed to an unqualified
set of participants. Therefore, Ogawa et al.’s encoding is not a strongly secure ramp
secret sharing scheme.
Also observe that the 3rd and the 4th participants can figure out s2 even when the
first qudit |s1〉〈s1| is the fully mixed state I7×7/7 as in Definition 1.
3 Definition of the Strong Security
To formally define quantum strong security, we use the same Gi and H j as earlier.
Definition 1 For integers 0 < L < k < n, we define a quantum (k, L, n)-threshold
strongly secure ramp secret sharing scheme as a completely positive trace-preserving
map [1, Chapter 8] W of σ on the state space S(⊗Li=1 Gi) into S(⊗nj=1 H j) with the
following conditions.
1. σ can be reconstructed from any k or more qudits of H j.
2. Let I ⊆ {1, . . . , L}, I = {1, . . . , L} \ I, σ1 ∈ S(
⊗
i∈I Gi), ρmix,I the fully mixed
state in S(⊗i∈I Gi), J ⊂ {1, . . . , n}, and J = {1, . . . , n} \ J . If |J| ≤ k − |I|,
then Tr⊗
j∈J H j W(σ1 ⊗ ρmix,I) is independent of σ1. In other words, no quantum
information of σ1 is leaked to shares whose indices belong to J .
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Observe that σ represents a quantum secret and n qudits in S(⊗nj=1 H j) repre-
sent n shares distributed to n participants. Note, Condition 2 with I = {1, . . . , L}
is equivalent to the conventional security definition [10, Definition 1]. In Condition
2, we assume that the unqualified set of participants represented by J has no prior
knowledge on the quantum state on I. This lack of prior knowledge is expressed as
the fully mixed state ρ
mix,I in S(
⊗
i∈I Gi).
When the quantum secret is an output of a nearly optimal quantum data compres-
sion [1, Section 12.2.2], then the output is close to the fully mixed state, otherwise it
allows further compression. The fully mixed state in Condition 2 is also justified in
such a case.
4 Encoding Secrets
We will propose an explicit construction satisfying the conditions of the last section.
Our proposal is a quantum version of classical strongly secure secret sharing [7,8].
As in [10] we set n = 2k − L indicating a pure state quantum secret sharing scheme.
Let Fq be as it was previously. Let x1, . . . , xL, y1, . . . , yn denote publicly known
pairwise distinct elements in Fq. Let Dk be equivalent to Fkq with an interpretation
as the set of coefficients of univariate polynomials over Fq with degree less than k.
For u = (u1, . . . , uℓ) ∈ Fℓq with pairwise distinct u1, . . . , uℓ and c ∈ Dk, define
Pc(u) = (pc(u1), . . . , pc(uℓ)) ∈ Fℓq to be the evaluation of a polynomial specified by c,
at points u1, . . . , uℓ.
Ogawa et al. [10, Lemma 3] proved the following lemma:
Lemma 1 Given a vector A ∈ Fmq whose elements are pairwise unique, the map
c ∈ Dk 7→ Pc(A) ∈ Fmq is injective if m ≥ k, and it is bijective if m = k.
Denote (x1, . . . , xL) by x and (y1, . . . , yn) by y, and let Dk(s) = {c ∈ Dk | Pc(x) = s}
for s ∈ FLq . By Lemma 1 we see |Dk(s)| = qk−L. Consider the encoding map W sending
|s1, s2, . . . , sL〉 ∈
⊗L
i=1 Gi to
1√
qk−L
∑
c∈Dk(s1,...,sL)
|Pc(y)〉 ∈
n⊗
j=1
H j, (2)
where si ∈ Fq. This map embeds an orthonormal basis of
⊗L
i=1 Gi into that of⊗n
j=1 H j. So this map can be uniquely extended to a complex linear isometric em-
bedding from
⊗L
i=1 Gi into
⊗n
j=1 H j.
Observe that the sizes of a secret and shares are the same as those of the conven-
tional quantum ramp secret sharing scheme by Ogawa et al. [10], which means the
coding rate of our proposal is also optimal in the sense of [10, Corollary 2].
Example 2 As a concrete case, we use the following (k = 3, L = 2, n = 4) quantum
ramp secret sharing scheme to encode a secret. Let |s〉 = |1, 5〉 be the secret that
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we wish to encode. We set the publicly known values x and y to be x = (1, 3), and
y = (6, 2, 4, 5). The set D3(1, 5) can now be calculated explicitly as
D3(1, 5) =
{ (6,2,0),(2,5,1),(5,1,2),
(1,4,3),(4,0,4),(0,3,5),(3,6,6)
}
. (3)
One can verify that each element c of D3(1, 5) has the property that si = c1 + c2xi +
c3x
2
i , as well as the fact that no other polynomials have the same property.
The encoded secret is the superposition of states indexed by evaluations of poly-
nomials specified by c, on y. We show explicitly that the state corresponding to
c = (2, 5, 1), is |5, 2, 3, 3〉 by the following calculation.
2 + 5y1 + y21 = 2 + 5 ∗ 6 + 62 = 2 − 5 + 1 = 5
2 + 5y2 + y22 = 2 + 5 ∗ 2 + 22 = 16 = 2
2 + 5y3 + y23 = 2 + 5 ∗ 4 + 42 = 2 + 20 + 16 = 38 = 3
2 + 5y4 + y24 = 2 + 5 ∗ 5 + 52 = 2 + 25 + 25 = 3
One can verify that the states, corresponding to all c ∈ Dk(1, 5), in the same order as
presented in (3), are
|4, 3, 0, 2〉, |5, 2, 3, 3〉, |6, 1, 6, 4〉,
|0, 0, 2, 5〉, |1, 6, 5, 6〉, |2, 5, 1, 0〉, |3, 4, 4, 1〉.
The final encoded state is therefore given by
|ψex〉 = 1√
7
(|4, 3, 0, 2〉+ |5, 2, 3, 3〉+ |6, 1, 6, 4〉+
|0, 0, 2, 5〉+ |1, 6, 5, 6〉+ |2, 5, 1, 0〉+ |3, 4, 4, 1〉). (4)
Note that if we looked at the subsystem on the last qudit, we have only a fully mixed
state. In general, if we looked at any n − k qudit subsystem of the encoded state,
we would only find a fully mixed state. We will prove this important fact as (11) in
Section 5.
5 Decoding Secrets
In this section we will show that by performing the unitary transformations in [10,
Section VII] with suitable modifications, k or more participants can decode the quan-
tum secret |s = (s1, . . . , sL)〉. As [10, Section VII], we assume that the number of
participants is exactly k.
Let the notation AB, where A ∈ Fmq is a vector and B ⊆ {1, . . . ,m} is an ordered
ascending set, be (ab1 , ab2 , . . . , ab|B| ) the vector A indexed by B. Let J ⊂ {1, . . . , n},
where |J| = k, be the set indexing the shares available to the k participants, and
J = {1, . . . , n} \ J . Now we introduce slightly modified notation from [10]:
Mcd(AB) =

acb1 . . . a
c
b|B|
ac+1b1 . . . a
c+1
b|B|
...
...
adb1 . . . a
d
b|B|

(c < d).
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This is generally a submatrix of a Vandermonde matrix. Note that M0k−1(AB) acts as
the linear transformation between the coefficients c of a polynomial of degree k − 1
to its evaluations on the set AB, that is,
c · M0k−1(AB) = c

a0b1 . . . a
0
b|B|
a1b1 . . . a
1
b|B|
...
...
ak−1b1 . . . a
k−1
b|B|

=

c0a
0
b1 . . . c0a
0
b|B|
+ +
c1a
1
b1 . . . c1a
1
b|B|
+ +
...
...
+ +
ck−1ak−1b1 . . . ck−1a
k−1
b|B|

=
(
pc(ab1), . . . , pc(ab|B|)
)
= Pc(AB).
This also means, by Lemma 1, that, if |AB| = k, the matrix M0k−1(AB) can be inverted
to retrieve coefficients c from Pc(AB).
As [10], without loss of generality, we let J = {1, . . . , k}. Starting with the en-
coded state (2), we apply the unitary corresponding (review Example 1 for the corre-
spondence) to the first decoding matrix
M0k−1(yJ )−1 (5)
on shares indexed by J . As explained above, this transformation will retrieve the
polynomial coefficients c from Pc(yJ ). The resulting state is
1√
qk−L
∑
c∈Dk(s)
|c, Pc(yJ )〉. (6)
Next apply the unitary transformation corresponding to the second decoding matrix:
(
M0k−1(x) M0k−1(yJ )
)
. (7)
Note that since n−k = k−L, the width of (7) is |x|+ |y
J
| = (L)+(n−k) = L+k−L = k.
This matrix has the effect of taking coefficients c and evaluating them at x and y
J
.
By our definition of Dk(s), the evaluation of the coefficients at x, is equivalent to the
secret. Therefore, the transformation (7) takes the state in (6) to the final state:
1√
qk−L
|s〉 ⊗
∑
c∈Dk(s)
|Pc(yJ ), Pc(yJ )〉. (8)
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It remains to verify that the n−L shares left over do not in fact rely on the decoded
secret at all. This step is necessary because, if there is any dependency between the
decoded secret |s〉 and the remaining n − L shares, the decoded secret will no longer
be unentangled from the remaining shares when the secret is a superposition of two
different pure states |s1〉 and |s2〉. For example, if the decoding on the encoded pure
state secret |s1〉 produced a dependence by the shares, on the secret, |s1, f (s1)〉, then
the decoding of shares encoded from 1√
2
(|s1〉 + |s2〉) will be
1√
2
(|s1, f (s1)〉 + |s2, f (s2)〉), (9)
which has a different density operator from the one we desire. We need the decoded
secret to be unentangled with the remaining shares, resulting in a state
1
2
(|s1〉 + |s2〉)(〈s1| + 〈s2|) ⊗ ρ, (10)
where ρ is the density operator of the remaining n − L shares. Thus to show our
decoder successfully decodes the secret, we will prove that the quantum state of the
remaining shares have no dependence on the secret.
First we prove that for a set X ⊆ Fq \ {x1, . . . , xL} the map c ∈ Dk(s) → Pc(X),
where |X| = k − L, is bijective. This can be seen in the forward direction by the fact
that c uniquely determines the polynomial’s evaluations. In the reverse direction, s
provides us with L evaluations of the polynomial that, when coupled with |X| more
evaluations at distinct points, provides us with k evaluations of the polynomial. By
applying Lemma 1 the k evaluations uniquely determine the coefficients. Therefore
the map between c ∈ Dk(s) and Pc(X) for a fixed s ∈ FLq is bijective.
We now replace the set X with yJ . Since |Dk(s)| = qk−L, (8) can now be re-written
as
1√
qk−L
|s〉 ⊗
∑
v∈Fk−Lq
|v〉|v〉. (11)
The remaning n − L shares are therefore a purification of the fully mixed state on the
J subsystem. Since it is unentangled with the first L shares, we have reconstructed
the secret.
Example 3 We will now provide a concrete example of the decoding scheme acting
on our previously calculated encoded state |ψex〉 in (4). Recall that the secret we
encoded was |1, 5〉. First we apply the unitary corresponding to M0k−1(YJ )−1. The
matrix M0k−1(YJ ) and its inverse are shown below.
M02(6, 2, 4) =

1 1 1
6 2 4
62 22 42
 =

1 1 1
6 2 4
1 4 2
 (12)
M02(6, 2, 4)−1 =

1 1 1
3 4 1
4 2 5
 (13)
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One can verify that the product of (12) and (13) is the identity.
We explicitly show that the result of (13) acting on state |4, 3, 0, 2〉 results in
|6, 2, 0, 2〉.
(4, 3, 0)

1 1 1
3 4 1
4 2 5
 = (4 + 9 + 0, 4 + 12 + 0, 4 + 3) = (6, 2, 0)
From Example 2, one can see that (c, Pc(yJ )) = (6, 2, 0, 2). One can verify (13) acts
similarly for the rest of the terms in (4), resulting in the following partially decoded
state:
|ψpd〉 = 1√
7
(|6, 2, 0, 2〉+ |2, 5, 1, 3〉+ |5, 1, 2, 4〉+
|1, 4, 3, 5〉+ |4, 0, 4, 6〉+ |0, 3, 5, 0〉+ |3, 6, 6, 1〉) (14)
The second part of the decoding is to apply (7), which is explicitly evaluated to:
(
M0k−1(x) M0k−1(yJ )
)
= M02({1, 3, 6}) =

1 1 1
1 3 5
1 32 52
 =

1 1 1
1 3 5
1 2 4
 . (15)
We verify that applying (15) to the state |5, 1, 2, 4〉 results in |1, 5, 4, 4〉 below.
(5, 1, 2)

1 1 1
1 3 5
1 2 4
 = (5 + 1 + 2, 5 + 3 + 4, 5 + 5 + 8) = (1, 5, 4)
One can finish verifying that applying (15) to the state |ψpd〉 results in:
|ψpd〉 = 1√
7
(|1, 5, 2, 2〉+ |1, 5, 3, 3〉+ |1, 5, 4, 4〉+
|1, 5, 5, 5〉+ |1, 5, 6, 6〉+ |1, 5, 0, 0〉+ |1, 5, 1, 1〉)
=
1√
7
|1, 5〉 ⊗
∑
e∈Fq
|e, e〉 (16)
The original secret has now been reconstructed in the first 2 qudits, and the rest of
the shares form only a purification of a fully mixed state that is independent of and
unentangled with the secret. Therefore the decoding is finished.
6 Strong Security of the Encoder
In order to prove that the proposed encoding method satisfies the definition of quan-
tum strong security, we prove Condition 2 of Definition 1 holds for our encoder.
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Let J ⊂ {1, . . . , n} be the indices of the shares available, and I ⊂ {1, . . . , L} be
the indices of qudits of the secret, where |J| = k − i and |I| = i. Let the secret on I
be a general pure state
|sI〉 =
∑
s∈Fiq
as|s〉, (17)
where as ∈ C and ∑s∈FLq |as|2 = 1. The secret to be encoded is ρmix,I ⊗ |sI〉〈sI|,
representing the secret on indices I and the fully mixed state in S(⊗i∈I Gi) on in-
dices I. We will show that Tr⊗
j∈J H j W(ρmix,I ⊗ |sI〉〈sI|) is the fully mixed state in
S(⊗ j∈J H j), and therefore independent of |sI〉.
For ease of exposition, we purify our secret by introducing a reference system of
|I| qudits. The purified secret is therefore equal to:
|ψsec〉 =

1√
q|I|
∑
d∈FL−iq
|d〉 ⊗ |d〉
 ⊗ |sI〉. (18)
The reference system will henceforth be indexed by I2. Let Rl be q-dimensional
complex linear spaces, representing qudits on the reference system.
We act on the space
⊗
i∈{1,...,L} Gi with our encoder. The reference system will
remain untouched throughout the proof and be traced out at the end. We denote the
n qudits that result from applying our encoder, as “encoded shares”. We now define
spaces A =
(⊗
l∈I2 Rl
)
⊗
(⊗
j∈J H j
)
and B =
⊗
j∈J H j. Together, A and B form the
space in which the encoded shares and reference system reside. The entire scheme
can be seen in Figure 1.
Since the reference system is untouched, we can re-express the encoded shares
indexed by J as
Tr(⊗ j∈J H j)W(ρmix,I ⊗ |sI〉〈sI|)
= TrAW′(|ψsec〉〈ψsec|), (19)
where W′ = I ⊗ W is the full encoding.
Applying W′ to the purified secret (18) results in the transformation from |ψsec〉
to:
|ψenc〉 = 1√
qL−i
∑
s∈Fiq
as

∑
d∈FL−iq
|d〉 ⊗
 1√qk−L
∑
c∈Dk(d,s)
|Pc(y)〉


=
1√
qk−i
∑
s∈Fiq
∑
d∈FL−iq
∑
c∈Dk(d,s)
as|d, Pc(y)〉
=
1√
qk−i
∑
s∈Fiq
∑
d∈FL−iq
∑
c∈Dk(d,s)
as|Pc(x
I
), Pc(y)〉, (20)
where (d, s) signifies the horizontal concatenation of d, and s, creating one vector of
length L. The second step in (20) comes from the definition of Dk(v = (v1, . . . , vL))
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Purified Secret =
|I2|=L−i
︷ ︸︸ ︷
△, . . . . . . . . . ,△
︸ ︷︷ ︸
reference-system
,
|secret| = L
︷ ︸︸ ︷
, . . . . . . . . . ,
︸ ︷︷ ︸
|I|=L−i
, , . . . . . . . . . ,
︸ ︷︷ ︸
|I|=i
i critical qudits
☞
☞
☞
☞
☞
☞
☞
☞
☞
☞
☞
☞
☞
☞
☞
✄
✄
✄
✄
✄
✄
✄
✄
✄
✄
✄
✄
I
W
Full Encoding
W
′ = I ⊗W
n encoded shares
︷ ︸︸ ︷
Shares =
k shares in space A
︷ ︸︸ ︷
△, . . . . . . . . . ,△
︸ ︷︷ ︸
reference-system
|I2|=L−i
,♦, . . . . . . . . . . . . ,♦
︸ ︷︷ ︸
|J |=n−k+i
,
space B
︷ ︸︸ ︷
♦, . . . . . . . . . . . . ,♦
︸ ︷︷ ︸
|J |=k−i
will be proven as fully mixed
1
Fig. 1 Strong Security Schematic. L qudits and a reference system of L− i qudits are encoded through W′,
to result in n shares and the reference system. Recall that W is the encoding map defined in (2), while I is
the identity map. The qudits in space B =
⊗
j∈J H j are the fully mixed state and have zero information
about the i critical qudits of the secret. △ represents the reference system qudits,  represents the secret
qudits, and ♦ represents the encoded shares.
as the set of polynomial coefficients such that the evaluation of the polynomial on x
is equal to v.
We now re-express (20) into the following:
|ψenc〉 = 1√
qk−i
∑
s∈Fiq
∑
d∈FL−iq
∑
c∈Dk(d,s)
as|Pc(x
I
), Pc(yJ ), Pc(yJ )〉
=
1√
qk−i
∑
g∈FLq
∑
c∈Dk(g)
agI |Pc(xI ), Pc(yJ ), Pc(yJ )〉, (21)
where g = (d, s), gI = s, and gI = d. Note that the number of shares in space
A is equal to the length of the vector (Pc(x
I
), Pc(yJ )). This length is |I| + |J| =
(L − i) + (n − k + i). Since n − k = k − L, the number of shares in space A are
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L − i + k − L + i = k. Therefore (Pc(x
I
), Pc(yJ )) is a vector of k evaluations of the
polynomial, specified by c, on pairwise distinct elements of Fq. By Lemma 1 this
uniquely specifies the polynomial, and therefore c as well.
We can now calculate the density operator ρenc = |ψenc〉〈ψenc| in (22).
ρenc =
1
qk−i
∑
h,g∈FLq
∑
c1∈Dk(g)
c2∈Dk(h)
agIa
†
hI |Pc1 (xI , yJ )〉〈Pc2 (xI , yJ )|
⊗|Pc1 (yJ )〉〈Pc2 (yJ )|
(22)
The notation |Pc1 (xI ), Pc1 (yJ )〉 is written as |Pc1 (xI , yJ )〉 for visibility purposes. Now
we perform the partial trace over space A on ρenc to obtain
TrA[ρenc] =
1
qk−i
∑
h,g∈FLq
agIa
†
hI
∑
c1∈Dk(g)
c2∈Dk(h)
=δc1 ,c2︷                                 ︸︸                                 ︷
Tr
[
|Pc1 (xI , yJ )〉〈Pc2 (xI , yJ )|
]
|Pc1 (yJ )〉〈Pc2 (yJ )|
=
1
qk−i
∑
h,g∈FLq
agIa
†
hI
∑
c1∈Dk(g)
c2∈Dk(h)
δc1,c2 |Pc1 (yJ )〉〈Pc2 (yJ )|. (23)
The trace evaluates to the delta function because as noted earlier, the space A contains
k evaluations of a polynomial, which, by Lemma 1, specifies c its coefficients.
Note that for all g, h ∈ FLq , the intersection of Dk(g) and Dk(h) is empty if and
only if g , h. The traced state (23) is therefore equal to
TrA[ρenc] =
1
qk−i
∑
g∈FLq
|agI |2
∑
c∈Dk(g)
|Pc(yJ )〉〈Pc(yJ )|
=
1
qk−i
∑
s∈Fiq
|as|2
∑
d∈FL−iq
∑
c∈Dk(d,s)
|Pc(yJ )〉〈Pc(yJ )|
=
1
qk−i
∑
s∈Fiq
|as|2
∑
c∈Ek (s)
|Pc(yJ )〉〈Pc(yJ )|, (24)
where Ek(s) =
{
c ∈ Fkq | Pc(xI) = s
}
. By the same argument that equates (8) to (11),
(24) is equivalent to
TrA[ρenc] =
1
qk−i
∑
s∈Fiq
|as|2
∑
v∈Fk−iq
|v〉〈v|
=
1
qk−i
∑
v∈Fk−iq
|v〉〈v|, (25)
which can easily be seen as the fully mixed state in space B. Since this subsystem is
the fully mixed state, it must be independent of the secret |sI〉. Thus Condition 2 is
satisfied, and our encoder has quantum strong security.
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Example 4 We now provide a concrete example of the strong security in a (k = 3, L =
2, n = 4) quantum ramp secret sharing scheme. We retain the notations in this section.
Let q = 7 be the dimension of each qudit. The public values x and y are x = (1, 3), and
y = (6, 2, 4, 5). Let I = {2}, be the index of the qudit of the secret that an unqualified
set of participants wants to steal. Let the set of unqualified participants be J = {3, 4}.
By the strong security condition, the shares 3 and 4 must be unable to produce any
information on the second qudit. Let the second qudit be |s2 = 5〉. The full secret,
including the reference system is therefore
|ψpure〉 = 1√
7
(|0, 0, 5〉 + |1, 1, 5〉 + |2, 2, 5〉 + |3, 3, 5〉 + |4, 4, 5〉 + |5, 5, 5〉 + |6, 6, 5〉) .
By applying the proposed encoding, we arrive at a state which is a superposition
of q2 = 49 basis states. We explicity show 7 basis states out of 49, which come from
encoding |1, 1, 5〉. Recall that the encoder only acts on L = 2 qudits, which in this
case is the last two qudits |1, 5〉. We have already shown the encoded state of this is
|ψex〉 in (4). Therefore, the encoded state is
|1〉 ⊗ |ψex〉,
a superposition of 7 basis states. One can verify that the entire superposition of 49
basis states is
|ψsec−enc〉 =
|0〉
7
⊗ (|2, 6, 4, 3〉 + |3, 5, 0, 4〉 + |4, 4, 3, 5〉 + |5, 3, 6, 6〉 + |6, 2, 2, 0〉 + |0, 1, 5, 1〉 + |1, 0, 1, 2〉)+
|1〉
7
⊗ (|ψex〉)+
|2〉
7
⊗ (|6, 0, 3, 1〉 + |0, 6, 6, 2〉 + |1, 5, 2, 3〉 + |2, 4, 5, 4〉 + |3, 3, 1, 5〉 + |4, 2, 4, 6〉 + |5, 1, 0, 0〉)+
|3〉
7
⊗ (|1, 4, 6, 0〉 + |2, 3, 2, 1〉 + |3, 2, 5, 2〉 + |4, 1, 1, 3〉 + |5, 0, 4, 4〉 + |6, 6, 0, 5〉 + |0, 5, 3, 6〉)+
|4〉
7
⊗ (|3, 1, 2, 6〉 + |4, 0, 5, 0〉 + |5, 6, 1, 1〉 + |6, 5, 4, 2〉 + |0, 4, 0, 3〉 + |1, 3, 3, 4〉 + |2, 2, 6, 5〉)+
|5〉
7
⊗ (|5, 5, 5, 5〉 + |6, 4, 1, 6〉 + |0, 3, 4, 0〉 + |1, 2, 0, 1〉 + |2, 1, 3, 2〉 + |3, 0, 6, 3〉 + |4, 6, 2, 4〉)+
|6〉
7
⊗ (|0, 2, 1, 4〉 + |1, 1, 4, 5〉 + |2, 0, 0, 6〉 + |3, 6, 3, 0〉 + |4, 5, 6, 1〉 + |5, 4, 2, 2〉 + |6, 3, 5, 3〉) .
As in Section 6, we now show that the subsystem in space Y of the shares
|ψsec−enc〉〈ψsec−enc| is the fully mixed state. This is equivalent to showing that the last
two qudits are fully mixed. It can be observed that the basis indices of any 3 qudits
are unique. For our case, let the first three qudits be traced out. We can verify that the
remaining 2 qudits have basis indices filling the entire set {(0, 0), (0, 1), . . . , (6, 6)}.
Thus the qudits in space Y are fully mixed. In other words, they have no information
about the secret |sI〉.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we have shown that Ogawa et al.’s secret sharing scheme does not sat-
isfy the strong security condition for quantum ramp secret sharing. We have provided
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a quantum strongly secure ramp secret sharing scheme based on its classical analog.
The difference between this encoding and Ogawa et al.’s encoding, is that the secret
is encoded into evaluations of polynomials instead of their coefficients. We have pro-
vided a decoding method so that, given any k shares, the secret can be reconstructed.
Finally we proved that this encoding method is strongly secure by showing that any
k − i encoded shares form a fully mixed state. Numerical examples are provided for
each proof. The coding efficiency of our encoding is the same as that of the conven-
tional quantum ramp SSs in [10].
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